Abstract
Introduction
European online infrastructure is largely controlled by a small number of American giants, which operate large networks and consumer-focused extensible platforms. Google's Android platform dominates mobile computing. Amazon does not yet dominate all shopping, but it has the dominant online shopping platform and is extending this platform to offer convenient smart home management, including voice-based shopping. Facebook is the dominant social networking platform, and indeed in much of the world it is the only social networking platform of any significance. And the market for cloud services is shared among American giants Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Salesforce. Microsoft also continues to dominate the traditional desk-top platform, though it has not been able to dominate any aspect of online infrastructure and is not a factor outside of cloud services.
Does this matter? Is this American domination of platform-based consumer-focused infrastructure important? It clearly appears significant to the European Commission, which has recently imposed a third fine on Google for abuse of monopoly power with its Android platform [28] .
How would we as academic researchers in information systems economics and strategy assess the significance of American domination of consumer-focused platform-based web services? Does it affect economic growth in the EU? Does it affect EU employment? Does it affect national security? Why did it happen? And, if indeed it does matter, what are the appropriate responses? What, if anything, should be done?
Our research methodology for this paper reflects its position as the first, exploratory study in a larger multifaceted study that will entail hypothesis testing with surveys and econometric analysis. Our research methodology in this paper begins with ethnographic studies, a small set of in-depth semantically rich interviews intended to allow us to develop our hypotheses. This paper is part of an ongoing research effort. The limitations of this paper and of the first stage of our study are addressed in a section on limitations. The next steps required to complete our analyses are reviewed in a section on future research.
Historical Context and Motivation
In an uncertain world, some industries have always been considered essential to national security. In 1904 First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher was concerned that if another European War were to occur, Britain would desperately need battleships. Battleship turrets were the most complex machinery of the era. He knew that if he stopped Purchasing battleships in 1904, he might have no remaining source of turret technology outside of Germany. Although Fisher considered Germany an ally in any future European conflict, battleship technology was too critical to entrust to any ally, and Fisher made expensive and unpopular commitments to the defense industry to preserve the necessary capability within Britain [19] . One might argue that internet technology and platform technology are as important today as naval capability was before the First World War. If President Trump can argue that aluminum and steel are so critical to national defense that competing companies in Europe, China, and Canada cannot collectively be trusted to meet US national security requirements [31] , then clearly Europe can argue that internet technology is essential today. Similarly, President Trump has argued that US jobs in coal, steel, and aluminum [9] are so essential to the US economy that they are worth protecting on national security grounds. Surely EU countries can argue that it is worth protecting at least some participation in the most profitable industries in today's economy.
We are not the first academic authors to address American domination of the net. A conference paper on the same themes was presented in Berlin in 2016 [8] . But this paper is the first step we have seen towards an integrated academic study of the problem.
Likewise, we are not the only authors addressing how to proceed to mitigate the domination of the net by American platforms. A coalition of German industrial firms has been studying and writing about how to respond [32] . Their proposal is to form a cross-industry coalition with its own portal, so that German consumers could have a German identity. That is, German consumers could log into future consumer-focused websites using a German login, instead of using the Facebook or Google or Amazon logins. It is not yet clear how this would mitigate any of the risks of American domination. Individuals do not use Facebook or Google or Amazon solely so that they have an ID to log into other systems, and consumers will continue to use Google to search, Facebook to hang out with friends online, and Amazon to shop. This proposal does not address the domination of American platforms in those areas. Again, we believe that our paper is the first step towards an integrated academic study of the extent of the problem and the first attempt at developing a strategy for responding.
Review of the Role of Semantically Rich Case Studies
Perhaps the most important proponent of using ethnographic observation and semantically rich case studies for the generation of testable hypotheses is [13] . Moreover, others have explored the significance of such studies specifically in the field of information systems research; see, for example, [20] and [3] . We feel that the questions we are asking are important, but that we are not yet ready to conduct more formal research. Until we are certain we are asking the right questions and asking all of the right questions, it is premature to conduct large surveys to explore the answers to those questions. Until we know whether executives believe that economic harm has occurred, and until we know what factors executives believe are significant or what sectors have been affected, it may likewise be premature to begin our statistical analyses. [21] provides moral support for assessing importance before conducting our formal research.
In the development of any field or discipline, there comes a period where 'respectability' insidiously reigns. ... Subtly, choices are made which profoundly affect the field: methodological rigor and precision become prized over phenomenological significance, researching over scholarship, conceptual edifices for scientists only, and reification over elucidation. [21, p. 5] We do expect to have statistical significance in the later elements of our study of American domination of the net in Europe. However, [22] [6] , who used the case study of Capital One to formulate the theory of newly vulnerable markets. The same authors then used a later, larger study of Capital One, after it had expanded into other lines of business, to test the theory [7] . Their use of Capital One was selected because it provided a natural experiment, consistent with the philosophy of [13] and [20] for using case studies. Subsequent studies by other authors have also used case studies in information systems to test the theory of newly vulnerable markets; see, for example [15] .
The Historical Role of Platforms and of Platform Envelopment
The recent attention to the platform revolution [23] suggests that platform operators have gained power only recently, and that platform envelopment as a form of monopoly power may be quite recent. The most obvious example of a platform-based strategy and the ability to develop monopoly power is Google and the development of Android, described more fully below.
The most recent case resolved by litigation was the American Department of Justice complaint against Microsoft for bundling features like Internet Explorer into their Windows operating system, pre-installing Internet Explorer, and creating interoperability problems for Netscape.
But the problems proposed by extensible technology platforms and by the use of platform envelopment Page 6126 strategies to gain monopoly power have existed for decades. For example, AT&T operated the first commercially successful radio station, WEAF, in New York in 1922. The Federal Radio Commission, the precursor to the Federal Communications Commission, was concerned that since AT&T was the only operator of long distance telecommunications in the US, AT&T could deny other operators of radio stations the technology they needed to create multi-station networks, by denying them the ability to transmit signals over land lines to remote locations for rebroadcast. The Commission therefore forced AT&T to choose between operating a commercial radio station or operating its telephony business, effectively ending their platform envelopment strategy [34] .
Motivation and Propositions, Used to Generate Hypotheses
Our initial expectations when starting this study were that American firms had earned billions of Euros monetizing private and personal information, in ways that were illegal for European firms. This gave American firms an incentive to enter markets that European firms did not have. Google's advertising business is its largest revenue source, and it is largely based on revenue streams from monetizing information based on individual customers' search history, email, GPS data, and numerous other sources. Facebook's largest revenue stream likewise comes from monetizing private information from its billions of users. Since there are no effective European competitors, these American giants enjoy near-monopoly power in the EU. Additionally, we expected that American firms then used their core businesses to develop platform envelopment strategies [14, 23, 24] , leveraging their near monopolies to dominate other business sectors. Google used revenue from paid search to develop Android. It used the Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA) to control placement of applications on all Android devices [11, 12] . The control created by the MADA gave Google the power to determine which apps could succeed, and which apps could not succeed in Europe. Indeed, abuse of the Android platform to obtain unfair (monopoly) advantage is the basis of the most recent 2018 EU Competition Commission's complaint against Google [29] .
Google is not alone in leveraging power in one core area to develop a powerful platform with a platform envelopment strategy. Amazon has used its domination of online sales to develop massive control over online books, and Apple has used its domination of online music sales to support very aggressive pricing models in its negotiations with music publishers, though neither of these appear to approach full monopoly power.
The creation and defense of a sequence of monopolies clearly violated both European and American antitrust law, and was the basis of the Department of Justice's successful litigation against Microsoft in 1998 [4] . See complaint: [33] . And yet, the courts' understanding of monopoly power in a platform envelopment strategy is less mature and less complete than the understanding of monopoly power in more traditional settings, especially in manufacturing.
Thus, our expectation was that the revenue source created by monetizing private information, when skillfully combined with leveraging initial monopoly positions to develop subsequent platform-based monopolies, would be widely seen as the basis of American domination.
Description of Recent Major
Privacy Violations Table 1 (at end) lists 49 major incidents of privacy violations as reported in the global mass media. The incidents occurred over the past eight years, and they originated almost equally within the US and outside the US. The references to the source material used to create these tables will be available online as Appendix A, which includes 52 articles obtained from published news reports. As we expected, the bulk of the reported incidents were against American firms. The vast majority, 40 out of 49 incidents or 82%, were against American firms. When formal complaints are examined the ratio is even more striking, with 25 out of 26, or 96% of complaints filed against American firms. Additionally, further examination indicated that many of these privacy violations were of economic, competitive, and strategic importance to these American firms. Not surprisingly, we found that a slight majority, 17 of 28 or 61% of the formal complaints were filed in the EU. Again not surprisingly, we found that the EU, and Germany in particular, were more likely to impose some form of punishment, with 13 out of 22 or 59% of penalties imposed in the EU. Finally, and not surprisingly, the vast majority of penalties, 21 out of 22 or 95%, were imposed against US firms.
Although we were able to substantiate empirically the role of monetizing privacy to create massive revenue streams that were not available to European firms, as described below our interviews did not show that executives shared our beliefs in the importance of either privacy violations or antimonopoly violations as the principal source of American companies' online power. It was necessary to develop a more comprehensive explanation for the domination of the net in the EU by a small number of American platform operators.
Results of Our Interviews
In June of 2018 we conducted 10 interviews with executives or officers in 8 organizations, including financial services, software services, manufacturers of consumer appliances, manufacturers of heavy industrial equipment, automobile manufacture, and the German military. All of these interviews were with German Page 6127 firms, which is a serious limitation that will be addressed in subsequent studies. While the EU is intended to function as a single market, it is not clear that all European executives face the same problems or have the same reactions to them.
Our interviews showed that our initial assumptions were far too simplistic, at least as an explanation of the beliefs of our German interview subjects. The results of our interviews are summarized below. We reported all of the answers suggested by our interview subjects; we list them by our subjective assessment of the strength of the subjects' beliefs and of the frequency with which individual ideas were suggested by different executives. No. German industry is already forging intra-industry alliances, such as the cooperation among automobile manufacturers. As a result, they will be able to provide smart car-to-car and car-to-road management, smart train-to-train and train to track and train to maintenance schedule management, and will be able to do so without need for any American intermediation.
Impact of the New General Data Protection Regulation
What impact will the new General Data Protection Regulation have on the balance between EU and American firms and how will it affect the power of currently dominant platform operators? None. It is already too late for EU firms to recover their competitive position.
Positive. It will limit platforms' ability to commit privacy abuses in the future, which will level the playing field at least partially.
Positive. It will increase transparency, so users will be concerned if their data are abused. It will permit transportability, so users who are dissatisfied with the way their data are used on Facebook can, in theory, easily migrate along with their friends to a new competing website that provides a "cleaner" service. Negative. EU firms will be held to even stricter standards while US platform operators will continue to ignore local regulations.
Hypotheses
We developed five hypotheses as a result of our interviews. We developed a sixth hypothesis when we planned how we might further explore whether the results of executives' beliefs, as expressed in surveys, were reflected in company performance, as reflected in econometric data. We note that it would be bad research design to attempt to test six hypotheses with ten data points. However, in this paper we are not testing any hypotheses. We did generate our six hypotheses from conversations with only ten individuals, but these conversations averaged over an hour, and there was ample opportunity to explore a large number of topics. These topics were then reduced to six hypotheses.
We also note that all of our initial interviews were with German executives, and that our hypotheses all make statements about European executives. This is a serious limitation, which will be addressed in two ways in subsequent phases of the study. We will conduct interviews in other EU countries. And we conduct our surveys in enough EU countries to examine national differences in the responses we receive. Hypothesis H1: European executives in all industries are aware of American domination of net-based businesses. Hypothesis H2: European executives in all industries are concerned about American domination of netbased businesses. Hypothesis H2A: European executives whose businesses require consumer interaction for retail sales are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H2B: European executives whose busiPage 6129 nesses require selling software to individuals are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H2C: European executives whose businesses require distributing consumer-focused software through to individuals through online platforms are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H2D: European executives whose businesses require selling cloud-based services to corporations are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H2E: European military officers are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H2F: European executives whose businesses require intense interaction between their companies and their consumer products after sales are extremely concerned. Hypothesis H3: European executives do not agree on the causes of American domination of net-based businesses. Hypothesis H3A: Some European executives believe American domination is due to advantages resulting from selling into a single market. Hypothesis H3B: Some European executives believe American domination is due to first mover advantages. Hypothesis H3C: Some European executives believe American domination is due to a greater appetite for risk among venture capital and private equity firms. Hypothesis H3D: Some European executives believe American domination is due to a greater willingness to skirt the limits of the law or the limits of enforcement of the law. Hypothesis H3E: Some European executives believe American domination is due to lax enforcement of privacy laws, lax enforcement of antimonopoly law, gaps in monopoly law, or some combination of these factors. Hypothesis H4: European executives do not agree on the future impact of the internet of things. Hypothesis H4A: Some European executives believe that the internet of things will create new problems for manufacturers of products that require interaction between the company and their products after sale, because giant platforms are better positioned to control interactions with consumers. Hypothesis H4B: Military officers believe that the internet of things will create new national security problems, due to the loss of control of critical infrastructure. Hypothesis H4C: Some European executives believe that the internet of things will create no new problems for them, because their companies or their industries will be able to respond effectively. Hypothesis H5: European executives do not agree on the way forward, or on the nature of appropriate responses to American domination of the net. 
Limitations of Our Current Research
We see six limitations in our current research, all of which will be addressed in the subsequent stages of our research program.
• The first and most obvious limitation is the fact that all of our subjects were German executives. This would be a problem if executives in other major EU economies face a different set of problems.
• The second limitation is a result of the small size of our initial sample [5, 27] . While a ten interviews may be enough to identify the set of critical issues, it is certainly not enough to identify their relative importance.
• Interviewer bias may be significant [2, 17] . We have our own expectations about how the netbased economy works and about how platform industries operate. We may have unconsciously led or subjects in directions that we expected them to follow, or we may have unconsciously interpreted their comments in ways that supported our expectations.
• Recency bias may be significant [10, 16] . The new General Data Protection Regulation had gone into effect days before our interviews and may had caused viewers to see privacy violations as a greater contributor to American domination than they would have previously. Alternatively, the implementation of the GDPR or may have led subjects to see the problem of privacy violation as more completely solved than they would have seen it before and thus as a less significant element in the domination of the net by American platform operators.
• Other, well-known effects may be significant, such as participant bias. Often in experiments where subjects are paid they seek to "to a good job" and they attempt to guess what the experimenters want to observe and then try to respond accordingly. That is not likely to be a factor here, but there is still a possibility that subjects may have attempted to cooperate and may have attempted to provide the answers we expected.
• Finally, while attitudinal studies will help us understand why certain effects may have occurred, they cannot demonstrate that they have indeed already occurred. Attitudinal studies complement econometric analyses, but they cannot substitute for econometric analyses.
Future Research -Addressing The Limitations of Our Current Research.
Our future research has three key elements. First we will conduct a additional interviews with executives in France, Britain, and Denmark, to learn if there are additional issues we should have included when constructing our hypotheses. Next, we will survey a broad executives in different positions, and in a wider range of industries, in Germany and elsewhere in the EU. We will also include government officials, industry associations, and military officers in our survey. This survey will specifically address our attitudinal hypotheses. We will determine if these executives believe that there is a problem with the domination of the net by American platform operators. We will determine, for those executives who do believe that there is a problem, what they believe the causes were. Finally, we will conduct econometric analyses to determine where EU firms have demonstrably suffered adverse effects that could be explained by American domination of the net. Even if we can demonstrate harm we will not have established causality of course. But we will have demonstrated that there are economic effects that are consistent with the beliefs of European executives, and that are at least correlated with the effects of American domination of the net.
Summary and Contributions
We feel that the topic of control of online infrastructure is vitally important. As trade in services becomes more important, and as international trade disputes are increasing, it is important to understand the extent to which domination of the net by American platform operators does or does not affect the EU economy. We believe that our interviews have enabled us to create a set of testable hypotheses, which makes a modest contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon. While there is universal agreement among our interview subjects that the net is dominated by American operators of platforms, there was little consensus on causes, effects, or appropriate responses. Our survey will allow us to assess the perceived relative importance of different factors, as causes, as impacts, and as responses. 
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